Males of several species have been shown to alter their mate preference in the presence of an 15 eavesdropping rival. This evasive tactic has been interpreted as an attempt by the courting 16 male to drive the attention of the rival away from the preferred female. The fitness return of 17 this deceptive strategy will depend on the costs of cheating for the actor (the displayer) and 18 the benefits for the rival (the bystander) of copying the choice of the displayer. We developed 19 a two-person nonzero sum game between two males that compete for mating with one of two 20 receptive females. Males could assess female quality with a varying level of uncertainty, 21 which was modelled using a Bayesian statistical decision theory approach. We explored the 22 actor and bystander payoffs under different levels of uncertainty in mate assessment and 23 difference in quality between females. We found that when being eavesdropped on is costly 24 (i.e. when females differ largely in quality), males are expected to cheat to reduce the amount 25 2 of public information that is available to the unintended audience. However, under these 26 circumstances, the value of the public information is low and the bystander is not expected to 27 copy the choice of the actor. Our model suggests that deceptive male choice may evolve only 28 under relatively restricted conditions and suggest that other explanations, such as, for 29 example, a reduction in the risk of precopulatory male-male competition may be more likely.
The deception hypothesis rests on the assumption that the costs of deceiving are smaller than 118 its benefits. Costs and benefits for the deceiving male will depend on the response of the 119 bystander to his deceptive signals. In turn, the response of the bystander will depend on the 120 costs or benefits that the bystander is expected to obtain if he uses the focal-male mating 121 preferences as a source of public information about the qualities of prospective female mates. 122 Benefits of copying for the bystander are expected to vary in relation to (1) the difference in 123 quality between two potential female mates; in particular, a bystander male should be able to 124 make an independent mate quality assessment when the difference in quality between two 125 potential mates is large (Witte & Ryan, 1998) ; (2) the probability that a female will remate 126 after having mated with another male; in particular it can be expected that this probability is 127 always <1, otherwise a female will remate indefinitely (Evans & Gasparini, 2013) ; (3) the 128 fertilization success in relation to mating order; unless there is a significant last male 129 precedence effect, mate choice copying should not evolve. To investigate the hypothesis that audience-mediated flexibility in male mating preferences 132 evolved to deceive potential competitors about the quality of prospective females, we 133 developed a game-theoretic model between two players: a focal male (the actor) and an 134 observer (the bystander). The actor has the priority in mating decisions and can strategically 135 7 control his manifested preferences for a high-over a low-quality female. The observer can 136 eavesdrop on the actor's mating behaviour and strategically use (or decide not to use) this 137 public information in mating decisions. 138 139 <H1>Methods 140 <H2>The model 141 The game is a two-person nonzero sum game between two males that compete for mating 142 with one of two receptive females. The two males are of similar quality, but play different 143 roles: the actor has the priority of choosing and, eventually, of mating with one of the two 144 females; the bystander can observe the behaviour of the actor and, only after the actor has 145 made his move, he can make his own. To provide the actor with the possibility of cheating, 146 the model assumes that the bystander can assess the mating preferences, but not the mate 147 choice of the actor (see below). Unlike males, females are assumed to differ in quality (e.g.
148
the number or dimensions of eggs). We name the high-quality female H and the low-quality 149 female L. 150 151 <H2>The Actor strategy: the use of private information 152 The actor assesses the females' quality with uncertainty. To model this, we adopt a Bayesian 153 statistical decision theory approach (McNamara & Dall, 2010) . We describe the perceived 154 female values with one of two stochastic variables: (1) = + , when the female is of 155 high quality and (2) = + , when she is of low quality. and (with > ) are the 156 true female qualities, whereas is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and 8 First, we consider the behaviour of the actor when the bystander is absent. Suppose that, at a 161 given time i, the actor is assessing the high-quality female, which he perceives of quality .
162
The actor has no prior information, but he is assumed to 'know' the likelihoods of perceiving 163 when a female is either of high or of low quality and to be able to 'compute' the relative If ( | ) > 0.5 then the male will court the female until time i+1; otherwise he will move to 169 and start courting the other female. Note that, at any time step i, the posterior probabilities are 170 assumed to be independent of previous assessments, that is, the male is thought not to use 171 prior private information.
173
The proportion of time spent by the actor with the high-quality female is the expression of his 174 preference. Since ( | ) > 0.5 when > 1 2 ( + ), (see Fig. 1a ,c), the actor's perceived 175 preference for the high-quality female is:
(2) 178 179
Analogously, = 1 − , is the preference for the low-quality female.
180
Second, we consider what happens when the actor perceives the presence of the bystander.
181
We assume that the bystander does not affect the perceived preferences ( ) of the actor, but 182 only his manifested preferences ( ). In other words, we allow the actor to cheat. This means 183 that, when there is a bystander, the actor can move away from a female even if he perceives 184 9 her of high quality or he can court a female even if he perceives her of low quality.
185
Specifically, we assume that the manifested preferences for the high-and low-quality females 186 are, respectively, = (1 − ) , and = 1 − = + (1 − ) .
188
can vary between 0 and 1 and it describes the strategy of the actor. When is zero, the 189 actor adopts a honest strategy and the perceived and the manifested preferences coincide.
190
Conversely, when = 1, the actor is fully dishonest in that he will court the female he 191 perceives of low quality. When waiting for his turn, the bystander obtains the females' quality information both 195 directly, by assessing them, and indirectly, by eavesdropping on the actor's behaviour. Thus, 196 when he eventually has access to the females, he is assumed to make an optimal use of the 197 previously acquired public information, as predicted by Bayes's theorem. The posterior 198 probability of the hypothesis that the assessed female is of better quality than the other (i.e.
199
the probability that she is the H female) will depend not only on her perceived quality ( ),
200
but also on her prior probability ( ) that this hypothesis be true:
204
The prior probability depends on how the bystander evaluates and responds to the manifested 205 preference of the actor. Specifically, we assume that the bystander's strategy is defined by As for the actor, we assume that the proportion of time spent by the bystander with a female is 224 the probability of obtaining ( | ) > 0.5 when assessing that female and it is an expression 225 of his preference. It may be shown that ( | ) > 0.5 when the perceived quality is greater 226 than the threshold , which depends not only on and , but also on the uncertainty level 227 2 and on the log (
) (see Fig. 1b , d for a graphical representation and the Appendix for an 228 analytical derivation of ). Thus, the bystander's preference for H is: probability that a female that has mated with the actor will mate again with the bystander ();
243
(3) the effect of mating order on fertilization success ().
245
The costs of cheating paid by the actor are represented by his decreased probability of mating 246 with the high-quality female. For fully honest actors, the model assumes that the probability 247 of mating with either the high-or the low-quality female is, respectively, and . When 248 the actor is cheating (that is, when < ), he is expected to experience a reduced 249 probability of mating with H, which is not compensated for by an increase in the probability 250 of mating with L. Specifically, we assume that his probability of mating with H is (1 − 251 ) , where  is the parameter defining the cost of cheating. The probability of mating with L 252 is still .
254
For the bystander, mating probability depends on his preferences and on whether the chosen 255 female has previously mated with the actor. We assume that recently mated females are less 256 prone to remate and the parameter  defines the probability that a mated female will remate 257 (0 ≤ ≤ 1).
259
When both males mate with the same female, sperm competition occurs. In this case, we 260 assume that between-male differences in fertilization success depend only on the mating order 261 and we define with  (with 0 ≤  ≤ 1) the proportion of eggs that are expected to be 262 fertilized by the bystander (i.e. by the second of the two males to mate with the female).
264
We define the payoffs matrices of the ( , ) game as: In our model, we assume that the mechanism of mating decision is analogous to the 304 computation of the posterior probability that a prospective mate is an appropriate partner. the type and the amount of (public) information that is available to the bystander, his 314 deceiving possibilities are expected to increase with decreasing assessment accuracy. For 315 example, when the direct assessment is accurate and the actor perceives a 0.75, but shows a 316 0.375 preference for the high-quality female (i.e. = 0.5), the trustful-copying bystander 317 (i.e. = 1 and = 1) will reduce his preference from 0.75 to 0.61 (Fig. 1a, b) . In contrast,
318
when the direct assessment is less accurate so that the actor's preference for the high-quality 319 female is 0.65, the same level of deception is enough to make a trustful bystander reverse his 320 preference and show a 0.71 mating preference for the low-quality female (Fig. 1c,d ).
321 322 <H2>Fertilization success and cheating costs 323 Although uncertainty in female quality assessment is a key parameter of the game, we start by 324 considering the ideal case, in which there is no uncertainty and, thus, no possibility of 325 deception. Since deception is fully ineffective, the actor is forced to play the 'honest' strategy, 326 = 0. The bystander's best reply to this strategy depends on his fertilization success ( ).
327
When < / , the bystander maximizes his payoffs by mating with the low-quality 328 female. Under this condition, the bystander will adopt the 'trustful-not-copying' strategy 329 ( = 1; = 0), which makes him use the public information against the female preferred by with the high-quality female even if she has already mated with the actor. In this case, the 332 bystander will adopt the 'trustful-copying' strategy ( = 1; = 1), which strongly penalizes 333 the actor.
335
Now, we introduce uncertainty into the game. In Fig. 2, we show the effect of the bystander's 336 fertilization success and of the actor's cheating costs on the Nash equilibrium strategies, under 337 a condition of low ( = 0.7) and high ( = 3, Fig. 2a, b) When assessment uncertainty is low ( Fig. 2a, b ) and < / , the 'honest' actor and the 342 'trustful-not-copying' bystander are still pure Nash equilibrium strategies. In contrast, when 343 > / the bystander always copies the actor ( = 1), who, in turn, would benefit by 344 deceiving the bystander into preferring the low-quality female. However, since uncertainty is 345 low, deception is ineffective and the costs it imposes on the actor usually exceed the benefits.
346
Under these conditions, the actor is forced to play the 'honest' strategy, the bystander 347 perceives the actor's behaviour as fully reliable and the 'honest-trustful-copying' strategy is a 348 pure Nash equilibrium pair. There are, however, a few exceptions, which occur when the 349 bystander's fertilization success is extremely high and the costs of cheating very low. Under 350 these conditions, the game has only mixed equilibrium strategies, in which the actor is no 351 longer fully honest (0 < ̅ * < 1) and the bystander no longer fully trustful (0 < ̅ * < 1).
353
In Fig. 2c, d , we show the solutions of the game when female quality assessment is highly 354 uncertain. The 'honest/trustful-not-copying' pair of strategies is still a Nash equilibrium, but 355 only for a fertilization success much lower than / . Indeed, the fertilization success 356 16 threshold above which 'copying' is the most remunerative strategy for the bystander 357 decreases with increasing assessment uncertainty: for = 3 the threshold is ≅ 0.55 ( Fig.   358 2d), for = 4 is ≅ 0.45,and for = 5 is ≅ 0.35 (see the Python notebook).
360
As explained above, when sperm competition penalizes the bystander, he should adopt the 361 'not-copying' strategy to minimize the risk of mating with an already mated female. If the 362 bystander knows with certainty which female the actor prefers, then he would be able to 363 minimize the risks of sperm competition by mating with the disfavoured female. However, 364 when the uncertainty of quality assessment increases, the actor's mating preference decreases 365 and the bystander's risk of mating with an already mated female increases. For example, if the 366 honest actor showed a preference for the high-quality female of = 0.6, the bystander that 367 adopted the 'trustful-not-copying' strategy would show a preference for the low-quality 368 female of = 0.62. In this case, there would be a 0.48 probability that the bystander and 369 the actor mate with the same female and a 0.52 probability that the chosen female is the low-370 quality one. But, if the bystander cannot prevent sperm competition, then he would do better 371 trying to compete for the eggs of the high-quality rather than for those of the low-quality 372 female. For this reason, the threshold from the 'not-copying' to the 'copying' strategy 373 decreases when the uncertainty of female quality assessment increases.
375
When the bystander switches from the 'not-copying' to the 'copying' strategy, the actor no 376 longer benefits from playing honestly, unless the deception costs prevent him from cheating.
377
In fact, the 'honest-trustful-copying' equilibrium pair of strategies is only found when the 378 costs of cheating are greater than a certain threshold, which increases with the bystander's 379 fertilization success. For example, for = 0.6, there are honest equilibrium pairs only when 380 ≥ 0.5, whereas for = 0.7 only when ≥ 0.7, and the honesty threshold increases to 381 = 0.9 for = 0.8 (Fig. 2c) . In all other cases, the game has no pure equilibrium pairs, but 382 only one or more mixed equilibrium strategies. Under these conditions, deception is more 383 effective when the cheating costs are high ( ≥ 0.5) than when they are low. In fact, Fig. 2c,   384 d shows that the mixed equilibrium strategies of the bystander tend to underestimate the 385 honesty of the actor (i.e. ̅ * > 1 − ̅ * ) when the costs of cheating are low and to overestimate 386 it (i.e. ̅ * < 1 − ̅ * ) when the costs are high. Independent of the costs, however, the level of 387 deception is always relatively low, being always ̅ * < 0.3. For these values of ̅ * , the 388 manifested preference of the actor for the highest-quality female is decreased but still higher 389 than 0.5. Thus, the actor seems more likely to retain honest information than to provide the 390 bystander with dishonest information. When being copied by an eavesdropper imposes a cost on the male making a mating decision, 394 the latter is expected to adjust his behaviour in order to limit or prevent the use of public 395 information (Nordell & Valone, 1998) . However, since these changes in behaviour are likely 396 to be costly, the behavioural adjustment is expected to make an optimal trade-off between 397 these two types of costs. Our game-theoretic model has been devised to study this trade-off.
398 Specifically, the model asks when it pays a courting male to reduce his manifested preference 399 for the high-quality female in order to decrease the probability that a bystander male will mate 400 with her. A similar question has been addressed recently by Dubois (2015). In her game, 401 males can adopt one of four tactics: (1) unselective males, which mate with both high-and 402 low-quality females indiscriminately;
(2) copier males, which use social information, when 403 available, or mate indiscriminately, when unavailable; (3) selective-insensitive males, which <H2>The intrinsic value of public information 479 The potential benefits obtained by manipulating public information depend on its intrinsic 480 value. Our model assumed that the male mating preference between two females is equivalent 481 to the posterior probability that one female is perceived of higher quality than the other.
482
Consistent with the optimality approach of the normative models in behavioural ecology 483 (Parker & Smith, 1990) , our model also assumed that posterior probabilities are computed by 484 integrating direct evidence with priors, as explained by the Bayes' principle (Castellano, 485 2009 (Castellano, 485 , 2015 . According to our model, the intrinsic value of public information (i.e. the information might be observed either (1) when the direct assessment is inaccurate and the 492 alternatives cannot be effectively discriminated from each other or (2) when the direct 493 assessment is accurate but costly to carry out.
494
In our game, when the difference in quality between the two females and the assessment 495 accuracy were both high, then the effect of public information on the bystander's mating 496 preferences was low. In contrast, when the difference in quality was small and the assessment 497 accuracy was low, the value of public information was potentially high. Empirical evidence 498 supports this prediction. For example, in species in which females use public information in 499 mate choice, 'copying' occurs more commonly when males have similar quality (Dugatkin, 500 1992; Dugatkin & Godin, 1992) , than when they show a large difference in quality (Brooks, 501 1996; Dugatkin, 1996a) . Furthermore, inexperienced (e.g. young) females tend to copy the 502 choice of more experienced females (Dugatkin & Godin, 1993) . When males do not provide 503 22 resources for reproduction or when these resources are not limited (Berglund, Magnhagen, 504 Bisazza, Konig, & Huntingford, 1993) , there is unlikely to be any substantial cost for the 505 female whose choice is copied. In contrast, model males pay a cost of being copied. The 506 results of our model suggests that the manipulation of public information is more likely to 507 occur when the difference in quality between the mating options is small. However, under 508 these conditions, the benefits of manipulation are also necessarily low.
509
The intrinsic value of public information also depends on the accuracy of mate quality 510 assessment. This, in turn, will affect the relative costs of using private and public information.
511
When private information is more costly to acquire than public information, it might be 512 beneficial to make a quick and inaccurate evaluation of the alternatives and to base the mating 513 decision mainly on public information. For example, in agonistic interactions, the direct 514 assessment of the competitive value of rivals might be costly, because it exposes the decision 515 maker to the risk of fighting. In these cases, the decision maker should trust the 'reputation' of 516 the opponent, rather than directly assess his value (Valone, 2007 , 1992; Pocklington & Dill, 1995) . When the predation risk associated with direct 520 mate assessment is high, female mate choice copying is more likely to evolve. In males, in 521 contrast, it is unlikely that the costs of assessing female quality are so high that they would 522 exceed either the costs of copying or the benefits of accurate evaluations. The results of our model suggest that the actor's strategic manipulation of public 526 information may evolve when the conflict between the actor and the bystander is so 527 strong that it pays the bystander to copy the actor's choice and the intrinsic value of 528 public information is high. In our game, this was represented by a reduction in the actor's 529 manifested preference for high-quality females in the presence of an audience. However, 530 a reduction in courtship effort is likely to decrease the actor's attractiveness and his 531 probability of mating with the high-quality female. The results of our model indicated 532 that the higher the manipulation costs the higher the reliability of public information at 533 equilibrium. If, in contrast, the actor pays no costs for manipulating public information 534 (i.e. his probability of mating with the high-quality female is not reduced), his best move 535 is to make his manifested preference for the high-quality female unreliable, so that the 536 bystander no longer benefits from using public information. The manipulation costs, 537 thus, can prevent the complete corruption of public information in social networks and 538 promote mixed equilibrium strategies that make actors only partially reliable and 539 bystanders only partially trustful. Our model showed that when being eavesdropped on is costly, an animal is expected to 543 plastically adjust its behaviour to reduce the amount of public information that is available to 544 the unintended audience. However, unless the costs of being eavesdropped on are extremely 545 high and those of manipulating public information extremely low, such an audience-mediated 546 plasticity is unlikely to be so pronounced that it results in an effective manipulation of the 
